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Executive summary
Central Asia, though referred to as a single region, consists of five culturally 
and ethnically diverse countries that have followed different political and economic 
transformation paths in the last 25 years since independence from the Soviet Union. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have in relative terms made strides in market reforms, while 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still have not completed their transitions to a market economy 
and Tajikistan represents an intermediate case.
In many respects, the historical legacy of the twentieth century and their unique 
geographical and geopolitical location have not helped Central Asian countries in their efforts 
towards economic development and integration.
After experiencing more than a decade of growth based on hydrocarbon booms, 
Central Asian countries are faced with increasing challenges resulting from falling commodity 
prices, declining trade and lower migrant remittances. The main policy challenge is to 
move away from commodity-based growth strategies to macro-oriented diversification and 
adoption of a broad spectrum of economic, institutional and political reforms. However, 
structural diversification is easier said than done.
The major obstacles to political reform and economic diversification in the five Central 
Asian economies are internal and external geopolitical factors and deeply embedded 
institutional weaknesses within countries, particularly in areas where economic management 
interacts with authoritarian political systems and legal institutions. Our analysis suggests five 
key policy lessons that could serve as points of departure as these countries move ahead.
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1 Introduction 
At the end of 2016, the five countries of post-Soviet Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of their 
independence, after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is a good occasion to examine where 
they stand now, the results of their transitions from centrally planned to market economies 
and the challenges the region faces. Central Asia also makes an interesting study because of 
its landlocked location and its historic legacy, including seven decades of communist rule 
and central planning. Moreover, Central Asia remains relatively understudied compared to 
other regions. 
Despite their shared history, and being referred as a single region, the countries differ 
in their levels of political and economic development, cultural and ethnic composition and 
relations with the outside world. 
In the 1990s, Central Asia experienced many of the same hardships of economic transition 
as central and eastern European and other former-communist countries, such as skyrock-
eting inflation, partial de-industrialisation and the collapse of Soviet-type welfare systems. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still have not completed their transitions to a market economy. 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have joined the upper middle-income group, while Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan remain in the lower-middle income category1.
The Central Asia countries are landlocked, though Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
border the Caspian Sea, which is not an open sea (Figure 1)2. Furthermore, the Soviet 
transportation network was concentrated on Russia and other Soviet republics, while 
connections with the outside world were almost non-existent. Despite some infrastructure 
investment in the last quarter of century, the lack of connectivity between Central Asia 
and the outside world remains a major obstacle to trade and economic development. This 
is also true of intra-regional trade relations, which are impaired by the incompatibility of 
individual economic regimes, continuous political tensions, prolonged conflicts in the 
neighbourhood (Afghanistan) and partly closed borders.
In addition, the recent decline in commodity prices has challenged, through trade, 
migrant remittances and financial market channels, Central Asia’s commodity-based 
growth strategies of 2000s and first half of 2010s, creating new sources of social and political 
risks in individual countries.
In this Policy Contribution, we analyse the socio-economic and political developments 
in Central Asia and the policy challenges faced by this region. Our paper is based on 
available cross-country comparable statistical sources, primarily those offered by the 
international organisations of the United Nations system. However, there are numerous 
data gaps, in particular for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, whose national statistical 
methodologies and data availability do not meet international standards. In those cases, we 
leave the gaps rather than try to present incompatible data.
2 Historical background
In the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire conquered most of Central Asia except for 
the northern part of what is now Kazakhstan. Under Russian rule, Central Asia was split into 
the Governor-Generalships of Turkestan (with Tashkent as its capital) and Steppes (capital: 
1 See https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519.
2 The legal status of the Caspian Sea and its territorial delimitation are the subject of international controversy. 
Russia and Iran consider it a lake rather than a sea (see Janusz-Pawletta, 2015).
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Omsk). The Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Khiva remained autonomous under the Rus-
sian protectorate until 1920 when they were defeated by Bolsheviks. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, under Soviet rule, the territorial division of Central Asia changed 
several times with the Soviet Union republic status of the five now independent states, and 
their current borderlines, emerging only in 1936. 
Until the 1920s, the Central Asian economy retained its traditional agrarian/pastoral 
profile, which reflected the largely nomadic and rural character of the region’s population. 
Industrialisation arrived in the Stalin era in the 1930s and was intensified during the 
Second World War when many industrial enterprises from the European part of the Soviet 
Union were evacuated to Central Asia. At the same time, large irrigation projects such as 
the Great Fergana Canal were implemented. Similarly to other parts of the Soviet Union, 
agriculture was forcibly collectivised in the early 1930s. 
The human costs of the Soviet modernisation of Central Asia were enormous. They 
included several rounds of famine in the 1920s and 1930s, repression and terror in the 
1930s, the building of a large network of labour camps (the so-called Gulag system) where 
political opponents from the entire Soviet Union were imprisoned and where they perished 
in large numbers, and mass-scale resettlements (ssylka in Russian) of populations from 
the European part of the Soviet Union. The latter affected social groups such as the kulaks 
(better-off farmers) and included the deportation of entire ethnic groups in the 1940s, 
including Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Crimean and Caucasian 
Greeks, Meskhetian Turks, Koreans, Karachays and Poles. 
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the partial dismantling of the Gulag system, the 
Soviet-type forcible modernisation and industrialisation continued but with the use of 
less coercive methods. These included the conversion of pastures (‘virgin land’ or tselina 
in Russian) in northern Kazakhstan into large-scale wheat farms, the building of the Main 
Turkmen and Karakum canals, and the operation of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site 
and the Baikonur Cosmodrome (both in Kazakhstan). Many of those projects caused 
severe environmental damage (such as the disappearance of the Aral Sea and radioactive 
pollution over large areas of Kazakhstan), which have not been overcome yet. 
Unlike the Baltic and Caucasus regions, the Central Asia republics were not at the 
forefront of the national emancipation movements in the late Soviet era. Until November 
1991, their leaders participated in negotiations on a ‘renewed’ Soviet Union agreement with 
the Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev. However, once the Soviet Union was dissolved in 
December 1991, the local political elites (mostly former leaders of the republican structures 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) grasped the opportunity and started to 
establish new authoritarian regimes (except Kyrgyzstan), based on national rather than 
communist ideologies. 
The rapid and forcible industrialisation of the Soviet era (with a strong focus on military 
needs) was associated with huge structural distortions and microeconomic ineffectiveness. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many industrial enterprises in Central Asia lost 
their previous markets and were unable to compete under the new market conditions. 
Partial de-industrialisation in the post-Soviet period was thus no surprise. 
After a painful transition period, growth picked up in 2000s, largely driven by growing 
exports of commodities such as oil and natural gas (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan), aluminium (Tajikistan), gold (Kyrgyzstan), cotton (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) 
and other metals (Kazakhstan).
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3 Geography, geopolitics and economic 
integration
Uzbekistan is the most populous country with 31.3 million people, followed by 
Kazakhstan, 17.5 million, Kyrgyzstan, 6 million, Tajikistan, 8.5 million and the least populated 
Turkmenistan, 5.4 million.
Figure 1: Political map of Central Asia 
 
Source: Bruegel. 
For many reasons, geography and geopolitics in Central Asia are not helpful to the region’s 
economic development. 
First, the region is distant from the major centres of world economic activity: North Amer-
ica, Western Europe, East and South East Asia. 
Second, all countries are landlocked (Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country in 
the world and Uzbekistan is double landlocked, ie it borders only landlocked countries) 
with limited transportation connections inside and outside the region. Major Central Asia 
transportation routes built during the Soviet era crossed and re-crossed the borders of Soviet 
republics. The transformation of formerly intra-Soviet administrative borders into borders 
between newly independent Central Asian states, with border and custom controls and, quite 
frequently, with visa requirements, created a huge challenge to intra-regional trade and to 
the domestic movement of people and goods within individual countries, especially in the 
densely populated Fergana Valley shared between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Third, on various occasions Central Asian countries have suffered from political instability 
(underpinned by ethnic, sectarian, clan and regional conflicts and authoritarian regimes) 
and an even more unstable neighbourhood. It is sufficient to mention the Tajik civil war in the 
1990s, ethnic riots in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) in 1990 and 2010, the popular uprising in Andizhan 
(Uzbekistan) in 2005, two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan (2005 and 2010), and occasional incur-
sions by jihadists from Afghanistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Political ambitions and 
personal animosities between authoritarian leaders have additionally limited the opportuni-
ties for intra-regional cooperation. 
Central Asia’s neighbourhood also poses numerous security risks and, therefore, places 
limits on the potential for trade, transit, investment and tourism. Risks include the continuous 
civil war in Afghanistan (since the mid-1970s), the separatist movement in the Xinjiang region 
of China, the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus 
and the long-lasting economic and political isolation of Iran. 
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Fourth, the Central Asian countries are not ethnically homogenous. The dominant ethnic 
groups amount to 63 percent of the population in Kazakhstan, 72 percent in Kyrgyzstan 
and between 80 and 85 percent in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan3. The Turkmen, 
Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh languages belong to the Turkish language family while Tajik 
belongs to the Persian family. However, Russian continuous to play the role of regional lingua 
franca, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Fifth, the region borders global and regional powers: Russia, China and Iran. Although 
Turkey does not border Central Asian countries, it seeks close economic, political and cultural 
links with them based on shared historical and language roots. The US as the global political 
and economic superpower has also been present in the region, especially at the time of the 
NATO-led combat mission in Afghanistan (2001-14) when Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan hosted US military bases and offered transit and logistic support to NATO troops. 
While Russia clearly dominated the region for the last two centuries, in the last twenty 
years China rapidly expanded its presence in Central Asia, especially in connection with large 
infrastructure investments (Box 1). As a result, Central Asian countries will face an increas-
ingly difficult challenge of navigating between the two4. In addition, the increasingly nation-
alist and revisionist tendencies in Russian politics, especially in the context of annexation 
of Crimea and the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, have raised serious concerns in Kazakhstan, 
which has a large Russian-speaking minority and long land border with Russia, and in Uzbek-
istan, in relation to its autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan (The Guardian, 2015). 
Figure 2: Main trading partners’ shares in total exports and imports
Source: Bruegel based on International Trade Centre. Note: missing are intra-regional trade data for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki-
stan, exports of natural gas from Turkmenistan to Russia and large part of Uzbek exports of gold and cotton. Iran’s data is for 2005 instead 
of 2008 and 2011, instead of 2015, for all countries.
3 2012-14 census data for all except Uzbekistan, for which the most recent data is from 1996.
4 Hypothetically, the Shanghai Cooperation Council consisting of Russia, China and four Central Asian countries (all 
except Turkmenistan) should ease potential tensions and facilitate political, security and economic cooperation in 
the region. However, the actual role of this organisation remains limited. 
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All the Central Asian countries are relatively open to trade. The least open is Uzbekistan, 
reflecting its autarkic development strategy and largely unreformed economic system (see 
section 4). In terms of exports and imports (Figure 2), Russia’s share tends to decrease 
over time while China’s increases. The EU is the largest export market for Kazakhstan and 
the EU remains quite significant as a source of imports into Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. Turkey is an important destination for Tajikistan’s exports and source for 
Turkmenistan’s imports (see also Mogilevskii, 2012). 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan can benefit from the transit trade between China and 
Iran. In 2015, when sanctions on Iran were lifted, the first train from China arrived in 
Tehran after travelling through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which took two weeks 
instead of one month for goods sent by sea. 
The list of Central Asia’s major trading partners reflects the geography and geopolitics of 
the region, as well as its institutional trade arrangements (Table 1). Only three countries out 
of the five belong to the World Trade Organisation: Kyrgyzstan (since 1998), Tajikistan (since 
2013) and Kazakhstan (since 2015). The importance of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), the organisation created by the former Soviet republics at the end of 1991 to 
retain free trade and visa-free movement of people, has decreased over time (Turkmenistan 
does not belong to the CIS). The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, which intends to 
create a single market, involves Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, its member states 
have put little effort into it and its economic modernisation potential is limited. Recently, 
the Eurasian Economic Union has been negatively affected by geopolitical tensions related 
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, such as the western sanctions imposed on Russia, Russia’s 
trade countersanctions against the US and the EU (which have not been replicated by other 
Eurasian Economic Union members) and Russia’s unilateral trade sanctions against Ukraine. 
The intergovernmental Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) includes all Central 
Asia countries and their southern neighbours5. However, its preferential trade agreements 
involve only some of them. The ECO Framework Agreement on Trade Cooperation was 
signed in 2000 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan but has been ratified only by 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The ECO Trade Agreement was signed in 2003 and entered 
into force in 2008. Of the Central Asian countries, only Tajikistan has signed and ratified this 
Agreement (as of 2016). 
Table 1: Trade and economic integration
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World Trade Organisation Yes Yes Yes No No Uzbekistan is an observer
Commonwealth of 
Independent States
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
All former Soviet Union 
states except Baltics, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine
Eurasian Economic Union Yes Yes No No No
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia
Economic Cooperation 
Organisation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey
Source: Bruegel.
5 See http://www.ecosecretariat.org.
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Interestingly, despite its increasing share of Central Asia’s exports and imports, China has 
not advanced formal free trade arrangements with the region, and trades with its Central Asia 
partners on WTO terms. 
The EU concluded bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with each 
country, which offered the Most-Favoured Nation tariffs in bilateral trade relations, even 
before the accession of Central Asian countries to the WTO. In 2015, the new-generation 
Enhanced PCA between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed in Astana. Kazakhstan remains 
the most important economic and political partner of the EU in the region because of its role 
as an oil exporter. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan benefit from the Generalised System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) and Kyrgyzstan benefits from a more generous GSP+ scheme, granted to them by 
the EU on a unilateral basis6.
Box 1: China’s role in Central Asia and the new Silk Road
The ancient Silk Road went through Central Asia with Samarkand and Bukhara (today 
in Uzbekistan) being among the biggest and most prosperous trading centres along the 
route. Today China is reviving the old trading route through its ambitious One Belt One Road 
project, which will develop infrastructure across Central Asia, South Asia and onto Europe. 
Three major belts/roads have been proposed: North, Central and South. The North Belt will 
go through Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. The Central Belt will go through Central Asia, 
Western Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Finally, the South Road will stretch 
from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. All Central Asian countries, 
except for Turkmenistan, are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which 
will fund this project along with the Asian Development Bank and other sources. 
In the last decade, China has actively increased its presence in Central Asia through 
investments in energy and infrastructure. Total trade between China and Central Asian coun-
tries has surpassed Central Asia’s trade with Russia (Figure 3), with commodities dominating.
Figure 3: Central Asia, total trade with China and Russia, $ billions
Source: Bruegel based on Trademap (data for Central Asian countries). Note: Total trade is a sum of exports and imports.
China has been actively investing in oil and gas pipelines, roads and railways, and accom-
panying infrastructure (Figure 4). These projects include:
• Oil: China constructed the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, which came on stream in 2006; 
China’s oil imports from Kazakhstan increased almost tenfold between 2005 and 2008. 
• Gas: China has completed the construction of a major gas pipeline from Turkmenistan. A 
second pipeline, the Line D through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is scheduled 
for construction, increasing China’s gas imports from Turkmenistan even further (Farchy, 
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/.
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2016). The pipeline broke the previous dominance of Russia’s Gazprom but at the cost 
of making Turkmenistan nearly totally dependent on China. Turkmenistan’s exports to 
China constituted 1 percent of its total exports in 2009, increasing to almost 80 percent 
by 2015, almost all of which is natural gas; Turkmenistan’s second largest trading partner, 
Turkey, takes only 5 percent of its total exports.
Figure 4: Map of the newly built and planned pipelines and railways in Central Asia
Source: Bruegel.
• Railways and other infrastructure: China committed to building the railway from Khor-
gos on the China-Kazakhstan border to the Aktau port on the Caspian Sea, including sup-
plementary industrial and infrastructure projects in Khorgos as the hub. Another project, 
the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail route is under discussion.
4 Reform progress and external support
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic system in 1991, economic transition in 
Central Asia started with a delay and has progressed slowly and unevenly. One reason for the 
delay was the continuation of the common ruble area in 1992 and most of 1993 in which the 
single currency (Soviet ruble) was managed by several central banks (Dabrowski, 2016a). This 
led to very high inflation in the entire post-Soviet space, including Central Asia (Figure 11 in 
section 5). Kyrgyzstan was the first to introduce its own currency in May 1993 followed by Ka-
zakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (all three in November 1993) and Tajikistan (May 1995). 
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Figure 5: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition 
Indicators, 2014
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Source: Bruegel based on EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). Note: the scale goes from 0 (no reforms) to 4.33 
(reforms completed).
As a result, macroeconomic stabilisation and market-oriented reforms in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan started only in 1994-95. In Tajikistan they started a few years later, after the 
end of its civil war (1997). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan resisted market transformation 
for much longer, and have tried to retain many of the instruments of a command economy. 
Figure 5, which shows the latest available EBRD transition indicators, reflects the uneven 
pace of economic reform. The scores of the two regional reform leaders – Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan – are similar to those of countries in south eastern Europe and the Caucasus but 
below those of the EU’s former-communist member states. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
show little progress (except small-scale privatization in Uzbekistan). Tajikistan represents an 
intermediary case. 
All Central Asian countries are doing poorly in the areas of governance and enterprise 
restructuring and competition policy, pointing to their limited progress in more complex 
institutional and legal reforms. This observation is confirmed by other available surveys and 
rankings. 
Corruption remains a major problem in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan (Table 2). Corruption is an additional burden, especially on the poor, in 
terms of their access to public and private services. Corruption, nepotism and favouritism 
hinder private sector development, particularly of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Furthermore, according to the Heritage Foundation (HF) Index of Economic Freedom (Table 
2) only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have managed to achieve partial economic freedom (the 
HF category of ‘moderately free’). Tajikistan is rated as ‘mostly unfree’ (similarly to Russia) 
and the two other countries are considered ‘repressed’.
When we disaggregate the summary HF ranking into individual policy fields (Figure 6) 
most Central Asian countries score low in terms of property rights, freedom from corrup-
tion and financial freedom, which, among other things, reflect their low quality judicial 
systems and their inability to enforce contracts. Moreover, weak judicial systems discour-
age foreign investors and, therefore, are slowing down the modernisation of Central Asian 
economies. Generally, the business environment remains difficult and poses a big obstacle 
to the diversification of Central Asian economies away from their commodity dependence 
(see sections 5-6).
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have achieved some progress in building market-oriented 
financial sectors. Kazakhstan has attracted meaningful foreign investment into this sector. 
It has also the largest banking sector as measured by the ratio of credit to the private sector 
to GDP, which was 58.9 percent of GDP in 2007 but then declined as result of the 2007-08 
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banking crisis (Figure 7). The currencies of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not 
convertible even for current account transactions, resulting in multiple exchange rates. The 
financial sectors of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain highly repressed.
Table 2: Governance indicators, 2015
Country
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom, world ranking and status, 2015
Transparency 
International, 
Corruption Perception 
Index (100 = very 
clean), 2015
World Rank in 
Economic Freedom
Status
Kazakhstan 69 Moderately free 28
Kyrgyzstan 82 Moderately free 28
Tajikistan 140 Mostly unfree 26
Turkmenistan 172 Repressed 18
Uzbekistan 160 Repressed 19
Source: Bruegel based on Heritage Foundation and Transparency International.
The largely authoritarian character of the political systems in Central Asia is the main 
cause of their poor governance and business climate, and their insecure property rights and 
rule-of-law deficit. According to the Freedom House Freedom in the World 2017 report7, only 
Kyrgyzstan is rated as ‘partly free’, while the others are ‘not free’. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
belong to the group of the 10 most politically oppressive countries in the world, alongside 
North Korea and Eritrea. 
Figure 6: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom by components, 2015
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7 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.
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Figure 7: Domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP
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External parties could play a significant role in supporting reforms in Central Asia, as they 
did for the central and eastern Europe region. Unfortunately, a disadvantageous geographic 
location and geopolitics have limited these opportunities (section 3). 
Although the two big powers directly bordering the Central Asia region – China and 
Russia – provide financial and development aid it largely serves their national and geopolit-
ical interests. The same is true of investment from China and Russia, the major part of which 
is provided by state-controlled corporations or companies that are close to their respective 
governments. Often these projects lack transparency. 
To lesser extent, the same is true of the two other regional players – Turkey and Iran. None 
of these neighbours is interested in supporting more political freedom or deeper institutional 
reforms in Central Asian countries. 
The roles played by the US and EU in the region have remained limited. Both provide 
technical assistance but its scale has reduced over time. The US interest in the region declined 
after NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan ended. The extent of future US engagement 
under the Trump administration remains unclear. 
The EU’s interests are also limited. In the first period of post-communist transition, the 
EU through its external policy tried to follow a common regional approach to all CIS coun-
tries, including via the single development aid framework – the Technical Assistance to 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). However, with the start of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the Central Asia region, which remained outside this 
policy framework, was moved into a general basket of developing countries, also in terms of 
technical assistance programmes. The EU’s relations with the region are governed by ‘The 
European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ adopted in 20078 and by 
bilateral PCAs (section 3). 
Occasionally, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have received EU Macro-Financial Assistance (in 
the form of loans and grants) as a supplement to their International Monetary Fund pro-
grammes (see the next paragraphs). Given Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s membership of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, the EU cannot offer them negotiations on free trade agreements, 
as it has done with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The same limitation in terms of opportuni-
ties for free trade arrangements with the EU applies to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which 
8 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10113_2007_init_en.pdf.
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are not WTO members and have not completed basic market reforms. Thus, the potential EU 
toolkit of policies that could support economic and political transition in Central Asia is limited.
In the context of the limited engagement of bilateral donors9, the IMF, World Bank, various 
UN agencies and the Asian Development Bank, have provided major financial and technical 
support to modernisation in Central Asia, particularly in terms of eradicating poverty and infra-
structure investment. This has included IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank lending 
on concessionary terms to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s relation-
ships with the IMF and World Bank are less developed because of their non-market economic 
systems and information closeness. Because they have reached upper-middle-income status 
(section 5), Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are no longer eligible to participate in most develop-
ment aid programmes. 
Overall, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have received the largest amount of official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) as a share of gross national income in the region (Figure 8), on a level 
comparable with the group of least developed countries to which they belonged during most of 
the analysed period. The peak for ODA came at the end of 1990s (Kyrgyzstan) and early 2000s 
(Tajikistan) and has since gradually declined for the entire region (except for Kyrgyzstan where it 
grew again after 2013). In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, ODA almost disappeared after 2005.
Figure 8: ODA as a percentage of gross national income
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5 Economic and social performance since 
independence
In the first half of the 1990s, Central Asian countries went through a painful process of correc-
tion of huge macroeconomic imbalances and structural distortions inherited from the Soviet 
era. They also had to adapt to the partial loss of the Soviet Union market (especially in the 
military-industrial sector) and the termination of direct and indirect transfers from Russia.
9  With the exception of Japan, which has financed some infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on concessionary 
terms.
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Growth recovery started in 1995-97 (Figure 9) but accelerated only in the 2000s with new in-
vestment in hydrocarbons and other mineral resources and the start of the global commodity 
boom. However, annual growth rates have remained volatile, largely because of fluctuations 
in global commodity prices. 
Figure 9: Year-on-year GDP growth rate, percent
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Source: Bruegel based on World Bank WDI.
Figure 10 summarises economic progress since independence. After the period of output 
decline in the first half of the 1990s, GDP per capita in current international dollars in PPP 
terms has systematically increased in all Central Asian countries. However, only Kazakh-
stan and Turkmenistan have managed to grow rapidly, thanks primarily to the hydrocarbon 
bonanza. Both countries continue to have higher GDP per capita in PPP terms than rapidly 
growing China. Kazakhstan overtook Turkey (at the beginning of the twenty-first century) and 
caught up with Russia in 2015. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan grew at a slower pace. 
As result, the income per capita differences between those two subgroups of Central Asian 
countries have increased in the last 15 years. 
Figure 10: GDP per capita in PPP terms, current international $, 1992-2015
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Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016. Note: IMF staff estimates for Turkmenistan (2005-15), 
Uzbekistan (2014-15) and Tajikistan (2015).
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Figure 11: Inflation, end of period, percent (logarithmic scale), 1995-2015 
Source: Bruegel based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016.
Other macroeconomic indicators have behaved similarly to growth rates. The turbulent 
1990s, especially the first half, were characterised by three- or even four-digit inflation in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Figure 11) and three-digit government debt as a share of GDP in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Figure 12). Part of that debt was owed to Russia, another part to the 
World Bank, other international development institutions and official creditors. The period 
of the global commodity boom (2000-08) was marked by high growth rates, annual inflation 
in the range of 8-10 percent, fiscal consolidation and growing international reserves. Then 
the global financial crisis of 2008-09 led to slower growth and some deterioration in fiscal 
accounts and balance of payments. Finally, the decline in commodity prices in 2014 further 
deteriorated the macroeconomic environment. The currencies of all Central Asian countries 
sharply depreciated (in particular, the Kazakhstani tenge), inflation went up, fiscal balances 
and balance of payments deteriorated, and growth further slowed down (Dabrowski, 2016b). 
Figure 12: General government gross debt, percent of GDP, 1997-2015
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Source: Bruegel based on the IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2016.
Kazakhstan (since 2000) and Turkmenistan (since 2008) used the boom years to create 
oil and gas-related sovereign wealth funds. However, their transparency remains either low 
(Kazakhstan) or non-existent (Turkmenistan)10. Furthermore, the Kazakhstan National Fund 
has served, to a great extent, as the source of financing for large infrastructure projects and 
10 See http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/.
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other public investment rather than as a reserve fund for rainy days. Kazakhstan has also used 
an increasing part of its oil revenues for current spending purposes. As result, its fiscal break-
even oil price, ie the price at which the fiscal balance is zero, went up from $65.4 per barrel 
in 2009-13 to $88.1 in 2015, exactly at the time when oil prices sharply declined to the level 
below $50 per barrel. Turkmenistan managed to bring down its fiscal break-even oil price 
from $81.6 per barrel in 2009-13 to $50.4 in 2015 (IMF, 2016, Table 5).
Despite its decreasing importance, agriculture continues to contribute around a quarter 
of value added in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Figure 13). All Central Asian countries recorded 
an expansion of mining and quarrying, especially Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and probably 
Turkmenistan (for which data is missing, see Figure 13), attributable to the oil and natural gas 
industry. Manufacturing in Central Asia is concentrated in labour-intensive sectors, such as 
food and textiles. The service sector remains relatively underdeveloped, except in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. 
Figure 13: Value added by sector, percentage of GDP
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Source: World Bank. Note: Industry is disaggregated between (1) mining and quarrying, and (2) manufacturing. (*) Comparative share of 
both sectors for Turkmenistan is missing for 2005 and 2015.
Agriculture’s share in total employment (Table 3) is higher than in total value added 
(Figure 13), indicating that a substantial part of labour force is locked in this low-productivity 
sector. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the share of agriculture in total value added is 16 percent 
while its share in total employment is almost twice as high. The situation is similar in Tajik-
istan. Since natural resource extraction is capital rather than labour intensive, it does not have 
the capacity to create significant employment. As result, employment in the industry sector 
(dominated by mining and quarrying) is small compared to agriculture and services. Under-
development of the services sector could be explained by the fact that between half and three 
quarters of the population in Central Asian countries lives in rural areas (Table 5). 
Table 3: Employment by sectors, percent of total employment
Country Year Agriculture Industry Services
Kazakhstan
1999 26.7 20 53.2
2013 24.2 19.8 56
Kyrgyzstan
1999 52.4 11.6 36.1
2013 31.7 20.2 48.1
Tajikistan
2004 55.5 17.9 26.2
2009 52.9 15.6 31.1
Uzbekistan
1999 38.5 19.4 35.2
2013 - - -
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Note: data for Turkmenistan is missing. Industry includes manufacturing; because of data limita-
tions no separate data is available.
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Remittances from migrants play an important role in the economies of Tajikistan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan (Figure 14). Russia is the major receiving country for migrant labour 
from Central Asia (UNDP, 2015). Turkey and Kazakhstan also attract migrants from Central 
Asia. For Tajikistan, remittances account for approximately one-third of GDP. Remittances 
help low-income households escape poverty and also boost consumption and growth in the 
receiving economies, help finance their large trade deficits and contribute to the develop-
ment of their financial sectors. 
Figure 14: Personal remittances received, percent of GDP
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Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Note: earliest possible data for Tajikistan is 2002 instead of 1999.
However, labour migration is not without social and economic costs. It involves the loos-
ening family ties, brain drains, migrants being employed below their skill levels and integra-
tion problems in the receiving countries. Individuals from remittance-receiving households 
are less likely to enter labour market, putting additional pressure on the domestic supply of 
labour (Justino and Shemyakina, 2012). Better policies are needed to reduce the potential 
negative effects of labour migration in both sending and receiving countries, and to foster 
closer cooperation between them. 
As we have noted, the early years of transition from central planning in Central Asia 
involved substantial social hardship. In 1990s, in all Central Asian countries except Kazakh-
stan, the poverty headcount rates at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (in 2011 PPP) were high or very 
high (Table 4). In the 2000s, as a result of rapid growth, these rates started to decline system-
atically, apart from in Tajikistan, where they remained high and increased again in the 2010s. 
There is no data for Turkmenistan (since 1998) or Uzbekistan (since 2003). Most likely, how-
ever, the share of their populations living below both World Bank absolute poverty thresholds 
in Turkmenistan decreased as result of the hydrocarbon boom. 
Table 4: Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (2011 PPP)   
(% of population)
Country at $1.90 a day at $3.10 a day
1993 1998 2003 2007 2013 1993 1998 2003 2007 2013
Kazakhstan 6.5 6.3c 4.5 0.5 0.0 23.1 21.3 3.7 0.3
Kyrgyzstan 44.3 30.6 28.1 9.9 3.3 63.9 51.5 67.6 33.6 24.0
Tajikistan 54.4b 30.8 10.4 22.6 86.1b 64.8 32.7 60.8
Turkmenistan 80.9 42.3 94.2 69.1
Uzbekistan 45.5 66.8 69.2 87.8
China 57.0 40.5b 32.0d 14.7e 1.9 82.3 67.2b 56.4d 33.0e 11.1
Russia 2.4 1.7 1.1 0.2 0.0f 10.1 7.3 5.1 1.2 0.5f
Turkey 2.6a 3.7 1.4 0.3 12.1a 13.2 6.3 2.6
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Notes: a = 1994, b = 1999, c = 1996, d = 2002, e = 2008, f = 2012.
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Overall, cross-country differences in poverty statistics reflect differences in levels of GDP 
per capita (Figure 10). The same observation applies to the comparison with Central Asia’s 
three major economic partners – China, Russia and Turkey. 
The first period of transition was also marked by increasing income inequalities (Figure 
15). However, since 2000, Kazakhstan has succeeded in bringing its Gini coefficient below 
30, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have stabilised it between 30 and 35, ie below the high levels 
recorded in China, Russia and Turkey. That is, income inequality in three Central Asia coun-
tries resembles that in EU economies rather than in other former Soviet Union and develop-
ing countries. Recent data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is not available.
Figure 15: Gini coefficient of income inequality
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Source: Bruegel based on Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Solt (2016), last updated July 2016, http://fsolt.org/
swiid/.
About half of the populations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and slightly above 35 
percent of the populations of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan live in urban areas. In Tajikistan, 
this share is even smaller – 26.8 percent in 2015, having hardly changed since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century (Table 5). This corresponds with the still high poverty level in that 
country (Table 4) because of low productivity in agriculture and other employment in rural 
areas (Table 3 and Figure 13). The low urban population share also means constrained access 
to public services, quality education, healthcare and business opportunities. On the other 
hand, if large swathes of the rural population start migrating to urban areas, it can result in 
increased pressures on already-constrained public services and might lead to social and 
political tensions. 
In the Soviet era, health services were provided largely by the state-owned health insti-
tutions and financed by the state budget, but informal out-of-pocket payments by patients 
and their families played an important role. After transition to a market system, healthcare is 
financed from three major sources – out-of-pocket financing by households, general budget 
financing and social health insurance systems (Leive, 2010). 
Despite attempts to legalise and cap the amounts of patients’ co-payments for healthcare 
services, the practise of informal payments and bribes remains widespread in the region 
(Scheil-Adlung and Kuhl, 2011). If one adds costs of medicines, which are rarely subsidised 
or refunded, total out-of-pocket payments for healthcare constitute substantial financial bur-
dens for households, particularly low-income households.
Public health insurance financed by mandatory contributions from employees and 
employers was introduced in Kyrgyzstan in 1996, and Kazakhstan in 2016 (Rechel et al, 2012). 
However, this mechanism is not easy to operate in Central Asian countries where a large part 
of the population is either engaged in the informal sector or works abroad. Kazakhstan is the 
only country where voluntary private health insurance plays some role.
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Since the beginning of the 2000s, male and female life expectancy have increased, espe-
cially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Table 5). Child mortality has decreased, in 
particular in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in line with progress accomplished in the rest of 
the developing world. Fertility rates have increased in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while they 
slightly decreased in other countries. They remain high (over 3) in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
which can be partly explained by the large share of population living in rural areas. 
Table 5: Other socio-economic indicators, %
Indicators Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Lower-
middle 
income 
countries
Upper-
middle 
income 
countries
2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015 2001 2015 2015 2015
Unemployment rate 
(percent of active 
labour force)
10.4 4.1 7.8 8.1 12.0 10.9 11.3 10.5 10.9 10.6 5.3 5.9
Urban population 
(percent of total)
55.5 53.2 35.3 35.7 26.5 26.8 46.1 50.0 37.3 36.4 39.0 64.1
Fertility rate (births 
per woman)
1.9 2.7 2.4 3.2 3.9 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.8 1.8
Under 5-mortality 
rate (per 1000 live 
births)
41.2 14.1 46.4 21.3 86.6 44.8 79.2 51.4 61.4 39.1 52.6 18.5
Life expectancy 
(male)
60.5 67.1 65.0 66.5 60.3 66.2 60.2 61.5 63.8 65.0 65.5 72.4
Life expectancy 
(female)
71.3 75.9 72.6 74.5 68.0 73.2 68.0 69.9 70.4 71.8 69.1 76.8
Health expenditure 
(percent of 
government 
expenditure)
8.4 10.9 11.9 11.9 6.4 6.8 13.7 8.7 9.6 10.7 6.7 n/a
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Note: most recent data available.
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Overall, Central Asia’s high share of population under the age of 14 and continued popula-
tion growth (which is rapid in some countries) point to favourable demographic perspectives 
with an ample supply of young labour in the coming decades (in contrast to other former 
Soviet Union countries, Europe and East Asia). Moreover, Central Asian secondary education 
enrolment is high (Table 6), reflecting the positive legacy of the Soviet education system. 
While the tertiary education system is not without imperfections, in Kazakhstan and Kyr-
gyzstan almost half of the respective age cohorts enrol in universities, with female enrolment 
exceeding male enrolment. At the other end of the regional spectrum, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan have tertiary enrolment rates below 10 percent. The challenge for Central Asian 
countries is to retain young talent, strengthen links between education and the labour market 
and improve the quality of education at all levels (Chubrik et al, 2011).
6 The way ahead and policy lessons
The decline in the prices of oil, natural gas, metals and agricultural raw materials in the 
second half of 2014 meant Central Asia suffered a huge adverse shock. The vulnerability of 
Central Asian economies to changes in the world commodity markets was exposed and the 
need for their structural diversification towards more manufacturing and services became 
even more urgent (see Linn, 2016). 
In any economy, policies aimed at structural diversification are not easy to conceptualise, 
coordinate and implement. The right approach is to rely on market forces, including 
international trade and investment, rather than administrative dirigisme, government 
planning and public investment (except in infrastructure, for which public authorities have 
an important role to play). However, in Central Asia where memories of central planning 
and dominant public ownership are relatively fresh, there is a natural temptation towards 
etatism and dirigisme (often associated with corruption and favouritism). This is particularly 
Table 6: Education, gross enrolment ratios, %
Level of education/ 
gender
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Lower-
middle 
income 
countries
Upper-
middle 
income 
countries
2000 2015 2001 2014 2001 2015 2001 2014 2001 2011 2014 2014
Primary 
Female 96.7 110.6 94.7 107.0 91.2 98.4 - 88.6 102.6 95.7 106 104.1
Male 96.1 110.5 96.7 108.3 98.3 98.0 - 90.1 102.1 98.0 103.8 106.7
Secondary 
Female 95.4 111.0 85.4 91.2 67.8 - - 83.7 85.0 94.9 64.7 94.4
Male 91.5 107.3 85.4 90.4 81.7 - - 86.9 87.9 95.9 65.9 91.9
Tertiary
Female 34.1 51.7 41.1 52.1 10.2 21.1 - 6.2 12.0 6.9 22 47.7
Male 29.4 40.5 39.3 39.9 25.1 31.5 - 9.7 15.0 10.9 22.5 40.3
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank WDI.
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the case for reform laggards Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Going in the direction of more 
state control would mean welfare losses and would further the region’s marginalisation in the 
world economy.
Market-oriented diversification requires a supportive macro- and microeconomic envi-
ronment. The decline in commodity prices led to nominal and real depreciation of Central 
Asian currencies, especially the Kazakhstani tenge. In theory, this could improve the inter-
national competitiveness of the non-commodity sector. However, given the geographical 
structure of non-commodity exports (to Russia and Kazakhstan, whose currencies depreci-
ated more than those of other Central Asian countries), this did not happen. In some coun-
tries, policies to keep official exchange rates over-appreciated at the cost of foreign exchange 
restrictions (section 4) made things even worse. That is, product diversification needs to be 
accompanied by geographical diversification of trade, underpinned by liberal trade policies 
and full current account convertibility.
Looking at the microeconomic environment, economic agents in non-commodity sectors 
must be able to develop and expand their businesses with minimum administrative obstacles, 
low transaction costs and protection of their property rights. This requires, in turn, improve-
ments in the business climate and governance, which means adopting a broad spectrum of 
economic, institutional and political reforms.
The list of required reform measures differs between countries but also contains a 
common agenda for the entire region. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan must complete basic market reforms: domestic price liber-
alisation, reducing explicit subsidies for food, energy and water, and cross-subsidisation (in 
public utilities), unification of exchange rate and current account convertibility, trade liberal-
isation, WTO accession, greater privatisation and elimination of barriers to private entrepre-
neurship, both domestic and foreign, and building financial market infrastructures. 
On the other hand, all Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where reforms 
are more advanced, face the same challenges of oppressive and predatory post-Soviet states11. 
These are deeply rooted corruption, rent seeking, state capture, administrative harassment 
of business and more broadly, a high degree of business uncertainty and insecurity over 
property rights. The situation looks particularly bad in all areas where economic management 
interacts with authoritarian political systems and legal institutions, especially those related to 
the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and public administration. Resolving these problems 
will not be possible without at least partial political reforms. If the above-mentioned dys-
functionalities and pathologies continue, they might ultimately provoke social and political 
instability and lead to political radicalisation. 
Closer intra-regional cooperation would also improve the business and investment 
climate. Given the region’s remote geographical location, its complicated borders, infrastruc-
ture inherited from Soviet times and cultural proximity (section 3), unrestricted movement of 
goods, services, people and capital between Central Asian countries would greatly contribute 
to their economic development. Closer cooperation would also help Central Asian countries 
to jointly promote their interests vis à vis those of their major neighbours. 
Overall, our analysis suggests some general policy lessons, which may also apply to coun-
tries outside the Central Asia region: 
1. Geography matters. Central Asia’s remote geographic location (far from major centres 
of world business activity), landlocked situation and underdeveloped transportation 
infrastructure do not help the region’s integration into the world economy and therefore 
their economic development, even if a given country/region is well-endowed with natural 
resources and educated labour. 
2. Geopolitics also matters. Geographic disadvantage matters even more if it is associated 
with adverse geopolitical factors – an unstable neighbourhood with unresolved conflicts, 
11 The same challenge is shared by other former Soviet Union countries, including Russia and Ukraine. 
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limited appetite for intra-regional cooperation, assertive policies of regional powers and 
limited interest from the two global powers (the US and EU), which traditionally support 
democratic and market reforms. 
3. Importance of institutional legacy. The total absence of the traditions of modern capital-
ist economies, political freedom and democracy in Central Asia has not helped its politi-
cal and economic transition since independence. However, such a historical background 
cannot be seen as the fatal factor, which will be in force forever. Good policies can help 
overcome poor institutional legacies, as happened, for example, in some Asian countries. 
4. Authoritarianism does not help in economic reforms. Our analysis suggests that there 
is a correlation between progress in political and economic reforms in the Central Asia 
region, as elsewhere in transition economies. The least politically free regimes (Turkmen-
istan and Uzbekistan) are also economically the least free, with several remnants of cen-
trally-planned systems. On the other hand, politically partly-free Kyrgyzstan is a regional 
leader in economic reform. In all Central Asian countries, hard or soft authoritarianism is 
an obstacle to reform of predatory post-Soviet institutions, and to the establishing of the 
rule of law and the fight against corruption, nepotism and rent seeking.
5. Natural resources are both a blessing and a curse. The presence of mineral resources, 
especially hydrocarbons, helped Central Asian countries to grow rapidly, to eradicate pov-
erty and to start large infrastructure projects, despite their geographic, geopolitical and 
institutional disadvantages and, in some cases (Turkmenistan), in the absence of genuine 
market reforms. However, resource booms have their limits, as shown by the 2014-15 
decline in commodity prices. Furthermore, the presence of large natural resource rents 
creates obstacles (via the real appreciation of the exchange rate) to the development of 
internationally competitive manufacturing and service sectors. It also encourages corrup-
tion and helps to consolidate authoritarian regimes.
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